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THE REPRESENTATION RIGHTS
OF EMPLOYEES AND CARRIERS: A NEGLECTED AREA
UNDER THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT
By

WILLIAM

J.

CURTINt

HE Railway Labor Act has been broadly criticized by observers from
labor, management and the academic community. In recent years,
such criticisms have tended to concentrate on the alleged debilitation of
the collective bargaining process induced by the Act's time-consuming
procedures which mandate government intervention. However, recent
court decisions forecast a new criticism of the Act and its creature, the
National Mediation Board (NMB). These complaints concern the Board's
handling of representation questions, and generally stated, allege that the
Board fails to recognize the rights of all of the interested parties in the
determination of bargaining representatives for crafts and classes of employees. With increasing frequency, serious charges are leveled against the
Board that it ignores due process, is resistant of public disclosure and is
reluctant to clearly define rules of procedure to which parties can refer
for guidance. In addition to criticism of the Act's inhibition of effective
and timely collective bargaining, there appears to be an increasing and
unchallengable body of evidence developed from the decisions of reviewing courts, supporting the allegations of critics of the Board's representation processes and procedures. To pass judgment on the efficacy of statutory
regulation of collective bargaining, one must lean heavily on the results
of that bargaining. While such results have hardly been salutory under
the Railway Labor Act, admittedly there may be many other factors contributing to the unhappy bargaining experiences of the airline and railroad industries. Such exculpatory rationalization, however, is not so readily
available when one reviews the Board's (and the Act's) inadequacies in
the area of representation elections. For example, it is easier for a critic
to compare the conduct of the Board with that of the National Labor
Relations Board and the comparison seems odious. Much of what is wrong
with the NMB can be remedied by it without statutory amendment. It
may be unrealistic, however, to expect the Board to either recognize or
remedy deficiencies which have been so long endured. In other areas,
statutory amendment would seem to be required as a matter of law. This
article will examine and comment upon some of the inequities in the
representation process as it now exists and is administered under the RailT
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way Labor Act, and will offer recommendations for administrative and
statutory changes needed to guarantee a fair and meaningful representation procedure.

I.

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT

Understanding the problems found in the Railway Labor Act as related
to air carriers necessitates an understanding of the development of that
Act. The roots were first formed in 1888 when, after a decade of labor
strife, Congress passed a bill' providing for voluntary arbitration of labor
disputes in the railroads. The arbitration board was composed of a Commissioner of Labor and two persons appointed by the President. Although
the law was in existence for ten years, the arbitration section was never
invoked even though during this period one of the worst rail strikes in the
nation's history occurred-the Pullman strike of 1894. In 1898 Congress
recognized the failure of this legislation and revised the law by passing
the Erdman Act' which stressed both mediation and voluntary arbitration
if mediation failed. The Act also outlawed "yellow dog" contracts and
discrimination by an employer against an employee because of union
activity. Section 10 made violation of the statute a criminal act, and an
employer violating the Act could receive a fine up to $1,000 per offense.
As did succeeding laws, the Act made little attempt to regulate union discrimination and misconduct. Although the Act was declared unconstitutional in Adair v. U.S.,' its features are found in present legislationthe Railway Labor Act of 1934 and the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932.
The Newland Act of 1913,' similar to the Erdman Act, absent the features that had been declared unconstitutional, established a permanent
Board of Mediation and Conciliation. Although the Board could on its
own motion intervene in a dispute, its power was limited to deciding
specific questions submitted to it, and the parties could interpret the award
as they saw fit. The failure of the Act lay in its inability to control unions.
Only three years after its passage, the railway brotherhoods demanded
changes in working conditions and refused to arbitrate the dispute. Instead of censoring the unions, Congress passed a special bill granting the
unions' demands.' As expected, other rail unions began making demands
for further concessions from Congress and the President.
With the outbreak of World War I, the government took over the railroads. General Order No. 8 established a labor policy to replace the Erdman Act which had been declared unconstitutional. In addition, boards of
adjustment composed of equal numbers from the carrier and the railway
unions were established to resolve grievances and contracts." If the board
'Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064, § 1, 25 Stat. 501.
2Erdman Act, ch. 369, 30 Stat. 424.
a208 U.S. 161 (1908).
4 Newland Act, ch. 4, § 26, 38 Stat. 103.
'Adamson Act, ch. 436, § 1, 39 Stat. 721 (1916). Congress should not be criticized t o much
for its capitulation in view of President Wilson's action. The President, after giving a speech on
how he yielded to no man in support of the principle of arbitration, went before Congress to
insure passage of the Act.
6 The carriers and the unions agreed to a single board called the "Commission of Eight."
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deadlocked, the disputes were then sent for decision to the director general
of the Railroad Administration. The Railroad Administration granted to
the unions most of the objectives they sought; however, the carriers could
live with all objectives except one-the rigid classification structure established for the shop craft employees. A more worthwhile accomplishment
of the Administration was its attempt to abolish racial and sexual discrimination.
With the end of the war, railroads returned to private ownership, and
railroad labor relations were regulated by the Newland Act. The railway
unions, fearing loss of the gains secured during the war, sought new labor
legislation which resulted in the Transportation Act of 1920.' Title III of
that Act established a nine-man tripartite Railway Labor Board, consisting
of three representatives from labor, three from the carriers and three
neutrals, to handle contract and grievance disputes. The Board held that
the carrier could not discriminate against the employees or interfere with
their selection of a bargaining representative. However, a series of court
decisions' completely neutralized the impact of this legislation. Moreover,
the unions were defeated not by court decisions, but rather by their folly
in calling a nation-wide strike against a Railway Labor Board decision
when public sentiment was against the strike. The defeat of the unions,
both in the strike and in the courts, caused readjustment in their thinking.
For the first time both the rail unions and the carriers attempted to write
their own legislation. The result of their efforts was the Railway Labor
Act of 1926' which was the prototype of our present legislation, containing provisions for a mediation board, emergency dispute boards and
boards of adjustment. While section 2, Third of the Act provided that
representatives would be selected by their carriers and the employees, the
necessary election or enforcement machinery was not contained in the
statute. The Act received a great boost when the Supreme Court in the
Texas and N. & 0. R.R. v. Brotherhood5 ordered a company-imposed union
disestablished, and a bargaining representative selected by the employees
reestablished.
The passage of the 1926 Act brought labor peace to the railroads for
the first time. However, with the advent of the Depression, unrest began
to develop, 1 and the voluntary arbitration began to break down. Hearings
were held with the intention that the resolution of contract disputes would
'Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 456, 469 (1920).
SIn Pennsylvania R.R. v. R.R. Labor Board, 261 U.S. 72

(1923),

the Court held that the

Labor Board's decision was unenforceable. The statute was also interpreted as not requiring the
carrier to recognize the employees' representative. In Pennsylvania R.R. Sys. v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
267 U.S. 203 (1925), the Supreme Court completely undercut the Act by finding that the carrier
need not recognize a union after an election, need not bargain with a union, could discriminate
against an employee because of union activity, and could otherwise interfere with the union. The
Act did not regulate the air transport field. But in 1925 the budding airline industry received its
big boost with the grant of air subsidies. The following year, the Secretary of Commerce was
charged with regulating the air carriers.
°Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926).
0 281 U.S. 557 (1930). The Court held that the provisions of the Act were judicially enforceable.
" During this period special legislation was passed to protect the rights of employees on bankrupt or distressed railroads.
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be made mandatory. The end result was the present Railway Labor Act
of 1934. The most important feature of the Act was the establishment of
the National Railroad Adjustment Board"2 to handle contract interpretation disputes. Other major changes were the substitution of the National
Mediation Board for the Board of Mediation, and the establishment of
certain safeguards to protect the rights of employees. At the request of
the "standard unions," the Act prohibited all forms of union security and
checkoff provisions."3 Significantly, the Act of 1934, other than changes
for union security and checkoff, is still the basic Act under which we
operate today.
The airline industry played no part in the development of the Railway
Labor Act, because the industry was still in its infancy when the 1934
Act was passed, and the first airline union, the Air Line Pilots Association
(ALPA), did not appear on the labor scene until 1930. When ALPA
appeared, one of the first actions it undertook was to seek coverage under
the Railway Labor Act-an activity which was continuous, though unsuccessful, from 1931 through 1935. With the passage of the Wagner
Act'" in 1935 and inclusion of the airlines among the regulated industries,
the activity died down. However, as various pieces of New Deal legislation were declared unconstitutional, ALPA feared that it would be unprotected if the Wagner Act were declared unconstitutional. Thus, although preferring the statutory scheme of the Wagner Act, ALPA pressured Congress for coverage under the RLA. Its request was granted" on
10 April 1936." The new amendment added Title II, which declared that
all the provisions of Title I (covering railroads) were applicable to the
airlines except the National Railway Adjustment Board (NRAB). In
place of the NRAB, the amendment provided for the establishment of an
Air Transport Board (ATB) when the National Mediation Board deemed
it desirable. However, to date, the ATB has not been established.
From the described history, two things are clear: First, the Act was
drawn to fit the peculiar problems of the railroads; and second, the airlines were placed under its coverage not through any logical design, but
because of ALPA's fear that unless it was covered by the RLA, it would
not be covered by any federal labor laws. While certain problems that
developed under the RLA have been common to both the railroads and
airlines, this has not been true in all areas, and when it has been true, the
problems have been magnified for the airlines by the fact that the Act was
designed for railroads. Both the Act and the NMB procedures were based
" The NLRB consists of eighteen representatives selected by the carriers and the same number
by the unions. The Board is divided into four separate divisions. Each division has jurisdiction over
a particular craft. Railway Labor Act, § 3, 44 Star. 578 (1934), as amended, 48 Stat. 1189, 45
U.S.C. 153 (1964).
1 In 1951, again at the request of the standard unions these provisions were deleted. Act of
January 10, 1951, 64 Stat. 1238.
" National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1934), as amended, 61 Star. 151, 29
U.S.C. 167 (1964).
"5Act of Apr. 10, 1936, ch. 166, 49 Stat. 1189, 45 U.S.C. 181 -(1964).
" During the hearing on the amendment, only a few minor airline officials testified. With hindsight, this might appear shocking. However, at the time of passage there was only one union that
the carriers had to contend with and no one could forecast the developments since that time.
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on a collective bargaining experience that had developed in the railroads.
When the airlines were placed under the Act, neither the carrier nor the
union had much experience with bargaining, and what experience they
had was similar to the industries regulated by the Wagner Act.
The question, therefore, is whether the Act should be changed. If the
answer is "yes," then, should the Act be amended, revised or scrapped
altogether in favor of a new law? I will venture to guess that both the carriers and the airline unions believe that change is necessary, although for
different reasons. While both will agree that the Act has not been a model
of clarity, they disagree sharply on the "why" and the "how" of improving
the Act so that the best interests of the public, the carriers and the employees will be served. It should be noted, however, that the parties' mutual
disillusionment has prompted few agreements on necessary revisions. In the
following material I will point out certain problem areas and suggest
solutions to them.
II.

REPRESENTATION

A. Administration
Measured by the tumult and the shouting, the statutory provisions most
in need of reform involve the Railway Labor Act's representation procedures. Despite the vocal concern for change in this area, one aspect of
the problem that is often overlooked involves the National Mediation
Board's administration of the Act's procedures. The major administrative
difficulty encountered in practicing before the National Mediation Board
is the absence of current, reported decisions. The Board last published a
bound volume of decisions in 1961. In fact, there exist only three volumes

of printed decisions since the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act. 7
The practitioner will have access to decisions reported after 1961 if he
has been placed on the NMB's mailing list. Yet, neither the bound volumes

nor the distributed cases contain all the decisions of the Board. The failure
of the NMB to bind its decisions on an annual basis, to provide existing

labor services with copies of decisions and to distribute all decisions to
the public, are constant sources of irritation in both advising clients and
in trying cases. The solution is obvious-publication. In order to relieve
the NMB of responsibility in these matters, the requirement of publication

of all decisions should be placed in the Act. Moreover, the decisions should
be made public no later than two days after they are released to the parties.
The decision-making process of the NMB leaves considerable room for
improvement. In place of the informal decision-making of the past, the
Board has developed the practice of issuing a "decision" after an exchange
of correspondence. The Board's order often does not set forth the facts,
the position of the parties, any legal discussion or a reasoned conclusion.
As a consequence, the true significance of the Board's action may not be
readily ascertainable from a reading of the document. This practice could

be eliminated by requiring that all decisions set forth findings of fact
17Administrative

Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237, 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964).
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and conclusions of law. Where needed for understanding, the correspondence should be attached to the decision.
In certain areas, the present Act is more than adequate, but the Board
has not employed the tools given to it. One such area is rule-making.
Although Rule 1206.8 of the NMB's Rules and Regulations provides a
method for establishing or amending Board rules, the NMB has not effectively utilized these procedures in the representation area. 8 The mechanics
of this procedure can readily be seen in the merger area. In the Air West"
case the Board disposed of a problem of representation where three carriers,
each with a different union, merged. The Board held that in the circumstances of that case, an election would be the proper method for resolving
the representation of the employees in the merged carrier. My objection is
not to the result reached; but rather, that the decision was a piecemeal
approach to an area with many ramifications. Thus, while we were given
the Board's position when three unions were involved, none representing a
majority, we were not given the answer when two unions are involved
or when the majority of the employees are unrepresented. Although the
decision affected other mergers, little advance public notice was given and
consequently, neither the industry nor its union was given the opportunity
to present their views. The failure of the NMB to do so has left many
questions unanswered. It has also resulted in attempts by unions that do
not represent employees in a merged system to gain representative status
through actions before the courts, the Civil Aeronautics Board and even
defunct system boards of adjustment. These actions usually do not mention "representation," but are clothed in the phraseology of contracts.
In a day when mergers are occurring more frequently, one may ask
why the Board did not attempt to treat the entire subject of mergers in
its decision. The answer is simple-the issue was not before them. However,
the answer also points up the limits of the use of the adjudicatory process
for attacking a small part of the problem. In circumstances such as these,
adjudication is basically an unsatisfactory method of informing the airline industry of the scope and nature of the Board's rule. It would have
been more satisfactory for the NMB to announce that it intended to promulgate a rule covering representation of employees following a merger.
The Board could have invited representatives of the carriers, unions, and
other interested parties to submit their views. A proposed rule could be
published and open to further comment from the public. After receipt of
the comments, the Board could adopt the rule as written, as modified or
hold further hearings. The final version of the rule would then be published along with explanatory comments reviewing the suggestions submitted, and stating why the proposals were or were not adopted. The
end result of such a process would not only be a rule but would be one
that had been intelligently arrived at and written to fit the needs of the
industry.
" The NMB has utilized rule-making in areas under its jurisdiction, including representation.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1206 (1964).
" NMB Case No. R-4013 (1968).
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One effect of this procedure would be to make the parties aware that
a change was coming, and provide them with information concerning its
direction. Thus, the parties could shape their actions to avoid needless
litigation. Also, it would give Congress an opportunity to intelligently review the rules and make its views known to the NMB. The failure of the
Board to utilize rule-making does not, however, rest on its shoulders alone.
The Board's rules,' at least in the representation area, allow "any interested
person" to petition the Board in regard to the issuing, amending or appealing of a rule. It does not appear that unions or the carriers, particularly
the latter, have exercised any initiative in this area.
One of the major problems with the NMB's administration of its Act
is the lack of staff, particularly legal staff. At present, the legal aspects of
the Railway Labor Act are handled by the Department of Justice. As a
practical matter this assistance has been limited to actual or contemplated
litigation. The failure to provide the NMB with adequate legal counsel
has resulted in a halt to the NMB's processes where the issues and interests
involved turn on a particular theory put forward by one of the parties.
Without lawyers to advise it, it is questionable whether the Board is capable of handling these complex and sophisticated legal issues. I believe
that this deficiency could be corrected without amending the statute;
however, if necessary, the statute should be so amended. The type of
staff should be left to the NMB. I would presume that a staff arrangement similar to the NLRB would be the proper starting point. The NLRB
has both a separate General Counsel's office and a legal staff for each Board
member.
B. Rights Of The Parties To ParticipateIn NMB Procedures
Section 2, Ninth was added to the Act in 1936. It established required procedure to select the employee's representative. Any discussion
of proposed change in this section must begin not only with an understanding of the section, but also an understanding of the purpose of the
entire Act. These purposes are as follows:
(1) To avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier
engaged therein; (2) to forbid any limitation upon the freedom of association among employees . . . ; (3) to provide for complete independence of
carriers and of employees in the matter of self-organization ....
Simply stated, the Act purports to grant to the employees the right to
join or not to join a union in the hope that by so doing work stoppage
will not occur. A reading of the purpose would appear to indicate: (1)
" (a)

Any rule or regulation in this part may be amended or rescinded by the Board at any

time. (b) Any interested person may petition the Board, in writing, for the issuance, amendments,
or repeal of a rule or regulation in this part. An original and three copies of such petition shall
be filed with the Board in Washington, D.C., and shall state the rule or regulation proposed to be
issued, amended, or repealed, together with a statement of grounds in support of such petition.
(c) Upon the filing of such petition, the Board shall consider the same, and may thereupon either
grant or dsny the petition in whole or in part, conduct an appropriate hearing thereon and make
other disposition of the petition. Should the petition be denied in whole or in part, prompt notice
shall be given of the denial, accompanied by a simple statement of the grounds unless the denial
is self-explanatory. 29 C.F.R. § 1206.8 (1964).
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That employees have a right to remain unrepresented and that right must
be protected by the NMB; and (2) that the carrier has a right to see that
the will of the majority of his employees is reflected in the representation
procedures so that industrial peace is secured. Unfortunately, the NMB,
with Supreme Court approval, 1 has completely eliminated the rights of
the carrier, and severely restricted the rights of employees who do not
wish to be represented.
The NMB apparently has taken the position that its function under the
RLA is to promote the unionization of employees. One method used to
accomplish this objective is the exclusion of employer participation in
representation procedures. To overcome the obvious interest of the carrier
in determining whether the union seeking bargaining rights is the representative of his employees, the NMB has construed the Act very narrowly. According to the NMB, since the Act refers to a representation dispute among the carrier's "employees," and not to a dispute involving the
carrier, only the employees-not the carrier-can institute a representation petition or be a formal party to such a hearing. A more logical approach would be to interpret the statute as limiting the actual voting to
employees, free from the interference, influence or coercion of the carrier.
This would recognize that the employer has a legitimate interest in the
election process which only he can fully protect.
The argument that will be advanced by the Board to counter this statement is that the carrier does participate in Board proceedings. The Board
has occasionally called a public hearing in which the carrier was permitted
to produce factual data, to cross-examine witnesses and to state its position with respect to certain issues. Though better than complete exclusion, this is far from satisfactory. First, as a non-party, the carrier must sit
idly by while a union campaigns among its employees. Since there is no
requirement that the application be filed within a certain period of time,
the campaign can go on for months. The longer it continues, the greater
is the employee morale problem. Even when a petition is filed and an
election is held, dissensions created by a long organizing campaign do not
easily disappear. Secondly, as stated above, the carrier has to live with a
bargaining representative chosen by the employees. If the representative
is not the majority choice, it is clear that labor relations peace will never
truly be obtained. To assure that the vote does reflect the will of the
majority, the carrier should have a voice in assuring: (1) That the voting
unit, or craft or class, is properly defined; (2) that all eligible employees
are entitled to vote and conversely, all ineligible employees are excluded
from voting; (3) that all unions which seek a representative status in the
craft are on the ballot; and (4) that the employees have a right to remain
or become unrepresented. Unless the employer receives a hearing on points
(1) and (2) and is allowed to actively participate in such hearings, it is
unlikely that an accurate record will be developed.
The only argument advanced by the NMB concerning why the carrier
2 Brotherhood of Railway Clerks v. Association for the Benefit of Non-Contract Employees
(ABNE), 380 U.S. 650, 662-71 (1965).
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should not be a party is its narrow reading of the statute. While its position has been upheld by the Supreme Court, it is equally true that the
Court did so on the ground that the choice of election procedures was
within the discretion of the NMB.' Had the Board exercised its discretion to allow full right of participation to carriers, such a decision undoubtedly would have been affirmed by the Supreme Court.
The Board's position can be supported only if one assumes that the
purpose of the statute was to force all employees to become unionized.
However, nothing in the statute or its legislative history supports such an
interpretation. Indeed, although the statute is aimed at protecting the
rights of employees, forced collectivization certainly seems contrary to
those rights. While Congress has not spoken on this problem insofar as
the RLA is concerned, the matter has not escaped notice. As early as 1947,
when Congress was considering the revision of the Wagner Act, it expressly included therein a provision granting employers the right to petition
for an election" and to participate in NLRB-conducted hearings. The same
right should be granted to carriers under the Railway Labor Act. The
carriers should not be required to wait any longer for the Board to properly
exercise its discretion. Accordingly, the statute should be so amended.
While it is difficult to understand the restrictions placed on the carrier's
participation in the election process, it is impossible to fathom the Board's
restrictions placed on the employees, more particularly, those employees
who do not wish to be represented by a union. As discussed hereafter, the
employees are not entitled to vote directly against a union. The only way
they can accomplish this result is by not voting, for if the votes cast constitute less than a majority of the eligible voters, the Board will not certify
the results. The practical result of this approach is to favor minority unions.
Thus, a union obtaining approval from only 26 percent of the eligible
employees will be certified so long as 51 percent of the eligible employees
vote. The Board's election procedures are designed to achieve unionization.
This is not any subterfuge by the NMB, but a simple misreading of the
Act's history and intent. A fair summary of the Board's position is found
in a report issued by it in 1957, in which it said:
The thing of importance ... is that the interests of the employees ... shall
be looked after by representatives of their own choosing. In other words, the
Act does not contemplate that its purposes can be achieved without employee
representation. ... "
Reduced to its simplest elements, the NMB said that the representation
procedures set forth in the Act do not exist for determining whether the
employees desire to have a union represent them and, if so, which union.
Rather, they exist only for the latter purpose.
The NMB's position is based on a theory which contradicts the legisla12

Id. at 659-69.

2

National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 453 (1934),
29 U.S.C. 159 (1964).
'

4

at 14.

NATIONAL

MEDIATION

BOARD, TWENTY

YEARS

UNDER

THE

as amended, 73 Stat. 525, 542,
RAILWAY LABOR

ACT,

(1957)
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tive history of the RLA. The 1934 House Report on H.R. 9861, containing the amendment to the 1926 Act, states:
2. [H.R. 9861] Provides that employees shall be free to join any labor union
of their choice and likewise be free to refrain from joining any union if

that be their desire and forbids interference by the carrier's officers with the
exercise of said rights [Emphasis added.]. 5
Similarly, Joseph P. Eastman, Federal Coordinator of Transportation and
principal draftsman of the legislation, expressed his view of the bill:
No, it does not require collective bargaining on the part of the employees.
If the employees do not wish to organize, prefer to deal individually with
the management with regard to these matters, why that, of course, is left
open to them, or it should be.'
When it reached the Senate, Senator Robert F. Wagner, the future
author of the National Labor Relations Act, declared:
I didn't understand these provisions compelled an employee to join any particular union. I thought the purpose of it was just the opposite, to see that
the men have absolute liberty to join any union or to remain unorganized."
The Supreme Court's decision in ABNE recognized that under the Railway Labor Act, the employees were to have the opportunity to reject
collective representation entirely. The Court's decision precludes a determination that the NMB's sole power is to certify unions as the representatives of the employees. There are several ways in which the NMB
can protect rights of unorganized employees. One means is for it to
establish procedures by which an employee can vote against a union, rid
himself of a union that has been certified and be assured that he will not
be faced with constant elections seeking to reverse his vote. A second
means is to grant unorganized employees the same rights as organized
employees to participate in NMB representation procedures.
The first right will be discussed later. As to the second, there is normally
an obstacle in obtaining a spokesman for unorganized employees. If an
employee is satisfied enough with his present state to remain unorganized,
it is unlikely that he will band together with others of a like mind to
protect this interest before the Board. However, in the famous ABNE case
this was exactly what the employees did. There, the unrepresented employees formed an association and sought intervention. The NMB dismissed
the petition on the ground that the association was not a proper party in
interest. The statute should be amended to grant this right to the employees,
and the extent of their participation should depend upon a showing that
they do represent the unorganized employees. Even if two or three groups
claim this status, they should be allowed to intervene in the same way
that two or three unions can participate in a proceeding.
The rights of the employees who wish to remain unrepresented and the
5

1 H.R. REP. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934).

26

7

Id.

" Senate Hearings on S. 3266, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
28380 U.S. at 669, n.5 (1965).
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rights of carriers have been stressed because many of the difficulties with
the NMB's administration and interpretation of the RLA have arisen from
the fact that the Board has ignored these interests and has construed the
Act to protect the interests of organized labor. If the Board were forced
to take note of other interests, it might make changes in its own policies,
thus eliminating the need for extensive revision of the statute.
C. Pre-Election Procedures
1. Jurisdiction
Any airline dispute, whether involving representation, contract interpretation or bargaining, first requires that the Act's jurisdiction be established. Generally, this will depend upon the statutory definition of "carrier"
and "employee." The Act covers air carriers in interstate commerce"
which includes both state-owned carriers"0 and foreign carriers with employees based outside the United States." While a carrier covered by this
section usually possesses a certificate of public convenience and necessity,
this is not necessary." The problems in this area turned upon whether a
particular airline is a common carrier subject to the provisions of the section, and this will turn upon the facts of each case. In order to avoid a
potential conflict, the National Labor Relations Board follows the policy
of consulting with the NMB. Normally, it will not assert jurisdiction unless the NMB has already declined to act." While the issue of whether an
airline is within the Act's coverage has not been a pressing problem, it is
unclear why the NLRB and NMB have not been able to establish a set
of practical standards or tests to determine which Act governs.
A greater difficulty is created by the statutory definition of "employee."
Section 1, Fifth lays down certain conditions which a person must meet
in order to be an employee. He must: (1) Be in the service of the carrier,
(2) be subject to the carrier's continuing authority to supervise and direct
the manner of rendition of service and (3) perform work as that of an
employee or subordinate official as defined by the Interstate Commerce
Commission. In meeting the first and second conditions, the NMB relies
upon whether the carrier has reported to the proper authorities, that the
persons are employees on its payroll; whether they have received free
transportation as to other employees; and whether, for purposes of other
statutes, they are considered employees. As to the third condition, whether
a person is considered an employee will depend on the type of work performed in connection with airline activity. If the connection is "remote,
tenuous, and negligible," he will not be considered an employee. On the
basis of this test, the NMB held that maintenance workers in an office
building owned by a railroad were not "employees." However, in a recent
decision 4 the Board certified a unit of hotel and restaurant employees for
" Railway Labor Act, § 1, First, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 73 Stat. 525, 542, 45 U.S.C.
151 3 (1964).
°California v. Taylor, 352 U.S. 553 (1957).
S' Rutas Aereas Nacionales, S.A. v. Edward, 244 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
aBulloch v. Capital Airways, 176 F. Supp. 449 (E.D.N.Y. 1959).
a Interior Enterprises, 122 N.L.R.B. No. 180 (1959).

' Spokane, Portland & Seattle Railway Co., NMB Case No. R-4062 (1969).
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a hotel and lunchroom. Obviously, the present problem is not in the
standard that the Board has adopted, but in its unwillingness to apply it
to all cases. If the Board will only abide by a standard written into the
Act, then that is what must be done.
Even if a person meets all these requirements, he will not be an employee
unless he is defined as such by the ICC. Thus, as the statute is written,
the status of an individual ultimately rests not with the NMB, but with
the ICC. A problem arises from the fact that the ICC has never attempted
to define an employee in the airline industry-the reason being that when
the ICC laid down its basic rules setting forth the various classes of railroad employees, there were no airline employees. The ICC has not attempted
to revise these classifications in respect to airline employees. As a consequence of the ICC's failure to act, the NMB has stepped in to fill the
vacuum. The NMB's actions are of dubious legality, however, since the
ICC has no power to delegate its authority, and the NMB has no jurisdiction to assume this function. From a practical viewpoint, the Board's
assumption of this task has not been successful because the Board, rather
than defining the class or craft in view of the needs and operations of the
airline industry, has resolved questions by relying on the practices and
procedures of the railroads. The answer to this problem may lie in a
statute establishing separate guidelines for the railroad and airline industries. The guides should be flexible enough so that the airline industry of
the year 2000 is not locked into the present definition. To obtain this
flexibility, the ultimate authority for defining these terms should rest
with the NMB after consultation with the CAB and after a public hearing
in which all interested parties can participate. The conclusion reached
should then be subject to judicial review.
Section 1, Fifth allows a unit to consist of not only employees, but also
"subordinate officials." The Act does not define the term, nor does it
establish any standards or guides to aid in this determination. The Board
has interpreted this term to include both middle management personnel,
as well as first line supervisors." As with the definition of "employees,"
the determination of the status of a "subordinate official" is divided between
the ICC and the NMB. From a review of the decisions, there appears to
be no clear-cut line dividing subordinate officials from non-subordinate
officials; the closest distinction being that a non-subordinate official has the
authority to hire, fire, or discipline without review by higher officials.
Obviously, if this standard was strictly applied, the only person exempt
from coverage might, in certain instances, be the president of the carrier."
Because lesser officials have been excluded, it is the NMB's and the ICC's
functions to define these distinctions.
From both the carrier's and employee's viewpoints, the coverage of
subordinate officials by the Railroad Labor Act should be eliminated. Since
'Northwest Airlines, NMB Case No. R-2257 (1953). (A supervisor service engineer was held
to be a covered employee.).
"In the Pan American case, NMB Case No. C-2006 (1953), the Board rejected this test. Later
cases indicated that the test was still being applied. Northwest Airlines, 3 N.M.B. 87, 90-91 (1960).
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subordinate officials are part of management, including them in a unit
with other employees, or in a unit by themselves, confronts them with dual
loyalties. How can such an official represent management's views to the
rank-and-file employees? If he believes that he is an employee like other
employees, then he will lower his performance standards to favor other
employees in the unit. In such circumstances, he cannot perform his primary duty to the carrier. Of course, if the official faced with this conflict
believes that his loyalties lie with the carrier, then his inclusion in the
unit will adversely affect other employees. The participation of management officials in a unit of employees obviously derogates from the dichotomy that the Act seeks. In fact, their inclusion would appear to be
unlawful. Section 2, Fourth declares that the employees must be completely free from the carrier's interference in the selection of their representative. If there are management officials in the unit, it is questionable
whether the employees are completely free in their selection. This conflict
was recognized by Congress when it revised the Wagner Act. Section 2 (3)
of the amended Act specifically excludes "any individual employed as a
supervisor." Over the years the National Labor Relations Board has devised guides to determine whether an individual is a supervisor. a7 The
Railway Labor Act could be interpreted to accomplish the same result;
yet, the failure of the Board to interpret the Act in this manner seems to
require that the Act be amended to accomplish this result. Accordingly,
the reference to "subordinate officials" should be eliminated; a provision
excluding supervisors added; and a definition of a supervisor that would
reflect the law as it has developed under the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, should also be added.
Two recent court cases a" have held that a union could enter into a collective bargaining contract with provisions that affect employees outside the
craft for which the union is certified. Such cases render a craft or class
determination meaningless. In order to insure that a union's contract is
co-extensive with the craft determination of the NMB, I would amend
the Act to render unenforceable all contract clauses that attempt to regulate the terms and conditions of employment outside the craft.
2. Craft and Class Determinations
Section 2, Ninth provides that an election is to be held in a unit
titled a "craft or class.""5 The Act does not further define this term
provides that the NMB is empowered to conduct an investigation to
termine an appropriate craft and who is within the craft.' Despite

enbut
dethe

37 An employee will be considered a supervisor if he possesses any of the following
powers in
regard to the employees: (1) Hire; (2) fire; (3) transfer; (4) suspend; (5) layoff; (6) recall;
(7) promote; (8) discipline; (9) assign; (10) reward; (11) responsibility to direct; and (12)
adjust grievances. The individual need not actually perform any of these functions to be a supervisor so long as he can "effectively recommend" such action. Cone Bros. Contracting Co., 135
N.L.R.B. 108 (1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 945 (1962).
" ALPA v. Capital Airways, Inc., - F. Supp. (M.D. Tenn. 1967); Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. NMB, 410 F.2d 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
" It was held in New York Central Railroad, NMB Case No. R-1150 (1945) that the terms
"class" and "craft" are synonymous.
o Section 2, Ninth, allows the NMB to appoint a committee to determine craft and class issues.
This method was utilized to determine whether the cockpit crew was a single unit or craft. Railway
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Act's requirement that the NMB determine the craft and class, the Board
often has abdicated this responsibility by relying either on the wishes of
the parties or the precedent established in regard to the railroads. The first
approach would be logical if all the interested persons were a party to the
agreement. However, there exists no reason to support such an approach

where the agreement is limited to the unions.' If the Act was amended
to allow both the carrier and unorganized employees to participate in the

NMB's representation procedures, this defect would be cured.
While the definition of a craft or class is not an easy issue, the criteria
established by the Board have caused the airlines considerable difficulty."2

This is due not so much to the criteria adopted" as to the results reached."
It appears that in the earlier years of the Act's administration, the Board's

determinations supported the craft lines established by the existing railway unions. The net effect of this approach was to assist the "standard
railway unions" in resisting raids by the non-standard unions. As the Act
was applied to the airlines, the Board resolved questions of craft and class
determinations by looking to the determinations made in regard to the
railroads, without recognizing that the customs and practices of the one

industry do not exactly fit those of the other industry. What is needed
at this point is the Board's careful examination of existing craft determinations to ascertain whether the employees therein are a homogenous group

of skilled craftsmen or a heterogeneous group with varying skills. The
Board should consider whether the multiplicity of units could be eliminated, leaving only those units that conformed to the present operations
of an airline. This objective could be achieved without the necessity of

an amendment to the Act, ' it could be achieved by enumerating the criteria used in establishing a craft along with a statement that the NMB
must consider the administrative divisions of the airline and that if a
technological or functional change occurs in the industry, the Board must
Labor Act, § 2, Ninth, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 48 Stat. 1186, 45 U.S.C. 151a, 152
(1964).
41 The Board has adhered to this approach even though there is only one union involved. Delaware, Lackawanna, and Western Railroad, NMB Case No. R-385 (1935). As a concession to other
unions, the NMB has held that certification in a stipulated unit does not constitute precedent in
other cases. Northwest Airlines, Inc., NMB Case No. R-2257 (1953).
42 In some instances the Board approach appears to work. Thus, the Board has held that a class
and craft must be system-wide. By so holding, the Board has eliminated such crafts as terminal
and departmental units. For the most part this policy appears to have worked well.
" Among the criteria supposedly utilized by the Board are the following:
1. The composition and relative permanency of employee grouping along class lines
of carriers in general.
2. The same but this particular carrier.
3. The extent and effectiveness of past arrangements,
4. The function, duties and responsibilities of the employees and the general nature of
their work.
5. The community of interest between employees, i.e., the existence of a close work
relationship with other employees.
6. Prior Board decisions.
7. The nature of the job, supervision, lines of promotion and seniority.
S. Efficiency.
4' The NMB presently has the power to splinter and amalgamate historic bargaining units in
the light of technological and functional change in the industry. UNA Chapter, FEIA v. NMB,
294 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
" In the ABNE case the Supreme Court stated that the NMB should consider whether a craft
was "tried and true" or was new and untested. 380 U.S. at 665.
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upon the request of any party redetermine the appropriate scope of the
craft. Once the parties have established the change in the industry, the
burden should be on the NMB to determine if that class or craft as
formerly established is still appropriate." Such a procedure would force
the NMB to keep its craft determinations current.
In order to assure that the Board's determination is based on the facts,
it must be required to hold an evidentiary hearing 7 as prerequisite to a
determination. Moreover, any determination should be subject to judicial
review provided the person seeking review could demonstrate one of the
following:
1. The case before the NMB was one of first impression and (a) the
Board did not explain its results, or (b) the Board relied on insubstantial reasoning;
2. the Board departed from precedent without explanation or without substantial policy justification;
3. the decision rested on facts not supported by the record;
4. the Board failed to conduct a hearing where a question of fact was
involved;
5. the hearing that had been conducted or a ruling contained therein
reflected prejudice against a party; or
6. the Board lacked jurisdiction to make the ruling involved.
This grant of direct review, coupled with the amendments making the
carrier and the unorganized employees parties to the procedure, would help
eliminate any arbitrary action by the NMB.
3. Restrictions on the Carrier'sFree Speech During A Union's Organiza-

tional Campaign
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits Congress from passing any laws abridging freedom of speech. In keeping with
this mandate, the Railway Labor Act does not prohibit a carrier involved
in a representation dispute from communicating to employees its position,
arguments and beliefs with respect to various issues involved in the union's
organizational campaign. Such communications, if they do not contain
threats or promises, are not false and misleading and do not have a corrupt
or undue effect on the outcome of the election, are not prohibited.'
Since it is the employees, and not the carrier, who are choosing a collective bargaining representative, the question is often raised concerning
what harm would result to the employees if the carrier were denied an
opportunity to communicate with them. The answer is obvious if we
focus on how unionization will affect an employee. To him the union
means group, rather than individual, bargaining. Once there is a union,
4 In some of the early cases the Board used a whole range of procedures to determine the facts

in a given case. This included investigation, public hearings, and written briefs. See National Airlines, 1 N.M.B. 423 (1947). While the Board and courts continue to emphasize that the hearing
need not take any particular form but need only conform to what was required by a particular
case, the Board tends to shy away from evidentiary hearings.
4' It is possible that part or all of these requirements were contemplated by the Court in ABNE
when it required the NMB to afford the parties procedural due process.
48 IBT v. Braniff Airways, F. Supp. -,
60 L.G. 10,008 (D.C.D.C. 1969).

1969]

AIR TRANSPORT LABOR SYMPOSIUM

the employee will no longer be able to communicate directly with management; instead, all contacts will be through a union intermediary. Before
yielding these rights, the employees should know: (1) The reasonableness
of the union's promises; and (2) the cost to him in the form of union dues.
It is highly unlikely that the union will supply the employee-voter with
this information; thus, the employee must be able to rely on the carrier
to make this data available to him. The employees should also be made
aware of certain disadvantages of unionism. For example, if the carrier and
union are unable to agree on new working conditions, the employees might
be forced to go on strike during which they will lose income and face the
possibility of being replaced. Conversely, the union might succeed in forcing a carrier to accept excessive demands, resulting in the reduction in
share of the travel market with the concomitant loss of jobs for employees.
In order for the employee to know of these and similar disadvantages, he
must rely on the carrier for information.
Despite the employee's need for the information and the constitutional
protection of free speech, the NMB and certain courts have restricted the
right of a carrier to communicate with the employees without applying
the same limitations to the unions. For example, in a recent case a court
found objectionable a statement that the employees were not being properly
represented by the union. However, the principal theme in most unionorganizing campaigns is that the carrier is not treating its employees
properly; thus, it is unthinkable that a court would restrict such an exercise of free speech. The elimination of the double standard in policing
organizational campaigns can be achieved only if the minimal restrictions
placed on unions are applied to the carrier's conduct. To achieve this
neutrality, section 2, Fourth of the present Act should be amended by
adding the following: "Provided further that nothing in this Act shall
be construed to prohibit a carrier from expressing any views, argument,
or opinion or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed,
graphic, or visual form, unless such expression contains a threat of reprisal
or promise of benefit determined under a standard applicable to all parties.""
D. Election Procedures
1. The Use of Authorization Cards to Determine Representative Status
Should be Prohibited
Section 1206.2 of the NMB Rules provides that the NMB "will authorize
an election or otherwise determine the representative desires of the employees" once certain conditions are met. It is the practice of the Board in
about ten percent of its cases" to determine representation questions by
reliance on authorization cards solicited by the union rather than on a
secret ballot election. This practice should be abolished. There are many
"'Bhd. Railroad Trainmen v. Richmond, F. & P. R.R. Co., - F. Supp. -, 69 L.R.R.M. 2884
(E.D. Va. 1968).
"This is substantially similar to National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935),
as amended, 61 Stat. 152, 29 U.S.C. 167 (1964).
5134 NMB ANN. Rp. 76 (Table 6) (1968).
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reasons why authorization cards should not be utilized in determining the
representation preferences of the employees. However, if every reason is
5
analyzed, we arrive at the same common denominator-unreliability.Y
They are unreliable because they are ambiguous; the employee is frequently
unsure whether he is designating a bargaining representative or requesting
an election. They are also unreliable because of the circumstance in which
they are signed-in the presence of a union organizer or pro-union employees which makes the employee susceptible to coercion or intimidation.
As Judge Harold Medina recently declared, "[an authorization card] is
a pro-union device that serves no other purpose than to afford a method by
which elections can be by-passed and the union ushered in without giving
the employees individually or collectively any voice. ...
In order to protect the free choice of the employees, a union should be
permitted to achieve representative status only if so designated in secret
ballot election. An amendment to accomplish this result should also be
broadly phrased to prohibit a carrier from "voluntarily" recognizing a
union. The only exception would occur in a situation where the carrier
engaged in certain conduct designed to prevent the immediate holding of
an election. Under these circumstances, the amended Act could permit the
NMB to issue a temporary certification to the union, provided that the
union or the NMB could establish:
1. That the carrier's conduct was flagrant, preventing the holding of a
secret ballot election fair to all parties;
2. that prior to the carrier's misconduct, the union had obtained cards
from 60 percent of the eligible employees in the craft; and
3. that all authorization cards"4 were obtained without coercion or
misrepresentation" during a 60-day period prior to the carrier's
misconduct.
A certification obtained under such circumstances should be automatically
revoked after four months if the union does not file a petition for a secret
ballot election. Moreover, the parties should be prohibited from entering
into an agreement operative beyond the period covered by the union's
temporary certification. If the proposed secret ballot election procedures
are adopted, there would exist no justification for permitting strikes or
" There have been many articles written about the unreliability of authorization cards in
designating a bargaining representative under the National Labor Relations Act. See: Lesnick,
Establishment of Bargaining Rights Without an NLRB Election, 65 MICH. L. REV. 851 (1967);
Comment, Union Authorization Cards, 75 YALE L.J. 805 (1965).
53NLRB v. Schwarzenbach-Huber Company, 408 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1969).
"Authorization cards should continue to be used by the NMB as evidence of the employees'
desire for an election. Points (2) and (3) should be applicable to cards for that purpose except
that the controlling period would run from receipt by the NMB rather than the carrier's
misconduct.
The number of valid authorization cards required to determine the existence of a representation
dispute should be more than 35 percent of the employees in the unit. This percentage would be
the same whether the employees are represented or unrepresented.
The NMB, once it has verified the authorization cards, should notify the carrier and at the
same time should set an election date (no sooner than forty-five days from the mailing date of its
letter).
" In order to ensure that the employee understands the nature of his act, the NMB should be
required to establish an approved authorization card form.
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picketing for recognition. Therefore, the Act should be amended to prohibit all recognitional strikes, picketing and related activity. This provision should be enforceable by injunctive relief and fines levied against
both the union and individual employees engaged in the prohibited activities.

2. The Form of the Ballot
The Railway Labor Act says nothing about the form of the ballot other
than that a secret ballot may be used." As discussed above, the NMB, on
the theory that the purpose of the Act was to select a representative rather
than to ascertain whether the employees wanted a representative, adopted
the policy of not allowing the employees to vote directly against the union.
Instead of being able to walk into the election booth and mark "no union,"
the employee wanting to vote against the union must abstain from voting
with the hope that others would also. Obviously, there is a danger that
unsophisticated employees may not understand that in order to vote against
the union, they must not vote. 7 As a result of this complicated procedure,
the employee might receive his ballot and mark it for the union solely
because that is the only apparent selection available to him.
In the ABNE case" the Supreme Court held that in view of the Board's
practice of treating non-voters as voting against the union, the NMB did
not exceed its authority by excluding "no union" from the ballot. The
Supreme Court's decision gives the employees who do not want to be
unionized an opportunity to be heard, but that is all that it does; it does
not give the employees an effective voice against representation. This procedure also permits identification of those employees who vote against the
union, a fact which would not be available in a true secret ballot election.
In summary, the Board's procedures create the most favorable conditions
for the union to achieve representative status.
Had the Supreme Court framed the question as, "did Congress intend
the NMB to utilize a ballot that concededly favors unionization," then its
answer would have been most assuredly in the negative,"9 for, as Senator
Robert Wagner declared during the debates on the 1934 amendments, the
Act was designed to ensure "absolute liberty to join or not to join a
union. ' It is difficult to imagine how placing roadblocks in the path of
those who wish to reject unions, such as found in the present NMB procedures, achieves for them the absolute liberty that Congress thought
s Railway Labor Act, § 2, Ninth, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 48 Stat. 1186, 45 U.S.C.
151a, 152 (1964).
" Upon the urgings of the Department of Justice, the NMB added the following language to
the ballot: "No employee is required to vote. If less than a majority of the employees cast valid
ballots, no representative will be certified." Even if the language were to the point, i.e., in order
to reject unionization, you must not vote, I do not believe most employees would fully understand
the NMB's "non-voting" procedures.
58
BRC v. ABNE, 380 U.S. 650 (1965).
" The purpose of the representation sections of the RLA was to provide "that employees be
free to join any labor union of their choice and likewise to be free to refrain from joining any
union if that be their desire ....
" H.R. REP. No. 7650, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1937).
" Hearings on S. 3266 Before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 124 (1934).
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necessary. Since the Supreme Court has refused to act, it is for Congress
to amend the Act so that its original mandate can be effectively carried out.
3. Resolution of the Results of the Election
Under section 2, Fourth employees have a right to choose representatives by a majority vote of the craft or class involved. The Board's resolution of what constitutes a majority has led a checkered career before arriving at its present position which is that the outcome of the election will
be determined by a majority of those eligible employees voting rather
than by a majority of the entire craft or class.61 This procedure is subject
to the limitation that more than 50 percent of the eligible employees must
vote. The present rule creates havoc where there are two or more unions
competing for representative status. In the Aeronautical Radio case " the
election resulted in the following outcome: 179 employees did not vote;
147 employees voted for Union A; and 74 voted for Union B. It would
appear that the NMB could have made one of two decisions-either that
"no union" won, or that there should be a runoff between "no union and
Union A." However, the NMB rejected both options and certified Union
A without a runoff on a theory that a majority of the employees wanted
a union, and that those voting for Union B would probably vote for
Union A if the choice were between Union A and "no unit."
As was seen in the ABNE case, it is clear that those not voting were
voting against a union. Thus, the NMB refusal to adopt either of the two
alternatives mentioned is only valid if its assumption that those voting for
one union would vote for another is valid. The Board cited no statistics
for this presumption; and in fact, there is much experience to the contrary. I would also suggest that the voting statistics of runoff elections
conducted by the National Labor Relations Board are to the contrary.
If Union B believes that it has a chance in the foreseeable future of mounting a successful organizational campaign, it would much prefer its adherents to choose "no union" over Union A. Even if Union B preferred
Union A, it is unlikely that it could convince all its followers to vote for
Union A. This is particularly true where Union A is the incumbent and
the employees who voted against Union A fear reprisals if it continues in
its present status. The fallacy in the NMB approach can be found in the
recent McDonnel-Douglas election conducted by the NLRB, in which
three unions participated: The Machinists, the Automobile Workers and
TEAM. In the first election, the vote was: Machinists-6,402, TEAM6,321, and UAW-5,585. Following the election, the Autoworkers threw
its support to TEAM. Under the NMB theory, TEAM should have been
declared the winner without a second election. However, in the runoff,
the Machinists and TEAM received an identical vote. Finally, in a second
runoff election the Machinists defeated TEAM-9,262 to 8,853. The conclusion to be drawn seems to be that the decision in the Aeronautical Radio
61Virginia Ry. v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515
62NMB

Case No. R-3739 (1965),

(1934).
aff'd, 380 F.2d 624, 626-27 (D.C, Cir. 1967).
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case was another example of the NMB's discrimination against employees
who wish to refrain from union activity or representation.
To correct this discriminatory practice, a union should not be certified
unless it receives the support of over 50 percent of the eligible employees
in the craft who have participated in the election.ea If neither "no union"
nor any union receives over 50 percent, there should be a runoff election
between the union receiving the highest number of votes and "no union."
This will present the clearest choice to the voters. An alternative to this
would be to provide a space on the first ballot where the employee can
indicate a second choice.
E. Post-Election Procedures
1. Post-Election Challenges
While the Railway Labor Act does not mention NMB consideration of
post-election challenges, courts have found this authority implied in the
NMB's power to investigate a dispute and to ascertain by appropriate
means the wishes of a majority of the employees. Where there are obvious
grounds for setting aside an election and directing a new one, no one can
quarrel with this procedure. However, the Board should be extremely reluctant to set aside an election where the activity in question cannot be

attributed to the carrier or to the union. However, the Act, at this time,
should not be amended other than by specifically declaring that the NMB
has this power, that the Board should conduct its own investigation" and
that the power of the Board is exclusive."
In order to insure that the Board's investigation provides due process to
all concerned, certain minimum requirements should be included in the
statute. Thus, the parties (including the carrier and unrepresented employees) will have a right: (1) To file objections to the election, with
supporting affidavits; (2)to have a hearing to resolve material questions
of fact in dispute; and (3) to have the NMB issue a report on the objections based on its hearing. Review should be granted in a United States
district court. However, such review as granted should be limited to: (1)
Whether the Board conducted an adequate investigation; (2) whether
the Board failed to provide a hearing on a dispute over a material fact;
(3) whether the Board's decision is supported by the record; and (4)
whether the decision is contrary to Board policy or to the Railway Labor
Act. In such circumstances, the Board should be given 30 days to correct
the defect in its procedures or to conform its decision to the record, policy
or law. There remains the question of when a new election should be conducted. While the Board has followed the rule that a sufficient time should
6'This

is on the assumption that "no union" is on the ballot (or a similar arrangement). If the

Board were allowed to continue its present practice, I would require that the union obtain the
support of more than 50 percent of the eligible employees in the craft whether they voted or not.
64 At present, these matters are referred to the Attorney General for advice and possible criminal
prosecution. The investigations are conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The NMB
staff should be expanded to carry out this function. In the alternative, the investigation could be
conducted by the Regional Offices of the National Labor Relations Board.
65 This will prevent attempts to by-pass the NMB by a direct challenge to the election in the
courts. IBT v. Braniff, - F. Supp. -,
60 L.G. 10,008 (D.C.D.C. 1969).
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elapse to eradicate the taint of objectionable conduct, there has developed
in recent cases a controversy over the application of the "sufficient time"
standard. Needless to say, it would be impossible to establish a statutory
period applicable to all situations. However, it would be advisable for the
statute to contain a maximum time limit within which the Board must hold
an election, for example, 90 days following a final decision by a competent
tribunal ordering a new election.
2. Two-Year Election Bar
Section 1206.4 of the NMB Rules requires that, following an election,
a two-year period must pass before a new election can be conducted."
However, this section is not applicable to a situation where the employees
in a prior election have rejected unionization. Under these procedures, a
union that is persistent can file election applications with the Board ad
infinitum with the hope that the constant harassment will result in the
employees voting for the union or the carrier unlawfully recognizing it.
The purpose of the two-year rule is to provide a period of stability following an election. Those familiar with labor elections realize the disruption
in work efficiency and morale problems which they breed. All would
agree that there is a need for a breathing spell following an election so
that activities and relationships can return to their pre-election norm. This
is true regardless of the outcome of the election, that is, regardless of
whether the union wins or loses. Accordingly, there exists no logical
justification for the exception when unionization is rejected.
In order to provide an effective two-year insulated period, the Act must
be amended so that the NMB may not direct an election, and a carrier may
not grant recognition in a union where in the preceding twenty-four
month period, the NMB has certified the results of an NMB-conducted
election. Any exception to this amendment should be equally applicable
to organized and unorganized units. To guarantee the effectiveness of this
approach, all organizational strikes, picketing and related activity 6 must
be prohibited, and fines should be imposed on the union and on the employees who engage in such activities.

III.

DISESTABLISHMENT OF A UNION REPRESENTATIVE

A. DecertificationPetitions
In the ABNE case" the Supreme Court declared that employees under
the Railway Labor Act were to have the option of rejecting unions."

In the IBT v. BRC, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
interpreting ABNE, commented:
The period runs from the date of certification.
671 would include among prohibited activities informational picketing by a union that has
00

sought recognition in the prior election. Conversely, I would prohibit a union that has engaged in
proscribed informational activities from filing an application for an election for a one-year period
from the end of its informational activities.
0
O BRC v. ABNE, 380 U.S. 650 (1965).
"' Id. at 669, footnote 5.
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[I]t is inconceivable that the right to reject collective representation vanishes entirely if the employees of a unit once choose collective representation.
On its face, that is a most unlikely rule, specifically taking into account
the inevitability of substantial turnover of personnel with the unit.7"
The Court is saying that if the employees have a right to reject representation initially, they retain the power to reject a union that has been certified.
Despite these rulings, the NMB has not provided a method whereby the
employees could return to an unrepresented status.71
Decertification procedures are necessary where there has been a change
in the employee complement. Such a change can occur merely by the passage of time. In the airlines this is particularly true where a large percentage of the certifications occurred two decades ago, at a time when
the industry was still in its infancy. Obviously, there are few employees
presently employed who participated in the original selection. Conversely,
most of the present employees have never had the opportunity to cast a
vote on the status of their representative. Without arguing numbers, it may
be that many of these employees would vote against their current representative if there existed an appropriate procedure by which they could
do so. Of course, the employee-complement change also can occur quite
suddenly when there has been a merger of two or more carriers and no
one union appears to have support of a majority of the employees; when
there has been a strike and the employees who supported the union have
been lawfully discharged and new employees hired; or when there has
been a substantial expansion of the employee complement. In all of these
circumstances, the post-change employees should have the opportunity
to participate in the selection of their representative.
This situation could be easily rectified by adopting the decertification
procedures found in section 9 (c) (A) of the amended National Labor Relations Act. Under that Act, employees wishing to decertify a union may
file a petition with the National Labor Relations Board supported by 30
percent of the employees in the unit, asserting that the present incumbent
no longer "represents" the employees in the unit. In the election that
follows, if the union receives less than a majority vote,"2 it is decertified.
A similar provision should be enacted into the Railway Labor Act, although a number less than 30 percent might be required to support the
petition. As a logistical matter, it would be extremely difficult for unorganized employees in a system-wide unit to obtain the necessary 30 percent support to file a petition.
70402 F.2d 196, 68 L.R.R.M. 2651 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
71 In the IBT v. BRC case, the NMB ordered the incumbent union placed on the ballot with
another union or forego future representation. The facts of the case were these: The IBT had filed
an election application while BRC was the incumbent representative. BRC sought to remain off
the ballot on the belief that by so doing it would continue as the bargaing representative. This belief
was grounded on the peculiar NMB ballot procedure whereby the IBT could win only if a majority of the employees voted. BRC expected that if the employees who favored BRC and those
who did not want any union did not vote, the IBT would not win the required vote. If this result
was achieved, BRC would continue as representative since the NMB had provided no method for
disestablishing it. The NMB, realizing the injustice of an incumbent who lacked support of the
majority of employees continuing as bargaining representative, ordered the union on the ballot. Id.
7' The incumbent would lose in the event of a tie vote.
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B. Employer Petitions
The National Mediation Board does not permit the carrier to file a
petition to determine the status of a union that claims to represent its
employees in a particular craft or class. If the amendments" suggested
above are adopted, the absence of this right in the situation where the
union initially seeks representative status would not be too serious. However, the right of the carrier to file would still be important in clarifying
the status of an incumbent union. The circumstances that would warrant
a carrier's petition are similar to those for an employee decertification petition, that is, a substantial change in the composition of the class, thus creating doubts that the union continues to represent the majority of employees
in the craft. The reason for granting this right to both the carrier and the
employees lies in the Act and in the practicalities of the situation. If the
carrier bargains with a union that does not represent a majority of the
employees, it is in violation of the law and subject to criminal penalties. 4
From a practical view, the carrier cannot always rely on the majority of
employees who wish to rid themselves of a union to effectively achieve that
end. This results, not only from the difficulty in their mounting an organizational campaign to dislodge an incumbent, but also from the fact that
many employees will refuse to sign a decertification petition for fear that
if their identities became known, they would be subject to reprisals by the
incumbent union. Additionally, there are situations where the carrier
would be the appropriate party to initiate the petition. This would occur
where there were conflicting claims by two unions (one an incumbent)
or where the craft was defunct and the carrier was seeking to regroup
certain functions with an existing unit. 5
A carrier, when beset by any of the above situations, should be allowed
to file a petition requesting an NMB-conducted election." Accordingly,
the Act should be amended to allow the carrier to file a petition challenging
the status of the incumbent union: (1) Where there has been a substantial
change in the employee complement or in the craft itself; (2) where the
carrier has a good faith doubt that the incumbent represents a majority
of the employees; and (3) where the union's loss of majority support is
not the result of unlawful activity on the part of the carrier.
T These amendments are: (1) The requirement that representative status can be achieved only
after a secret ballot election in which the employees have a right to effectively vote against union
representation; (2) the outlawing of recognitional strikes and picketing; and (3) the granting to
the carrier of the right to participate in all NMB proceedings as a party and to effectively express
its views
during the union's organizational campaign.
74
Cf. NLRB v. Garment Workers (Bernhard-Altmann), 366 U.S. 731 (1962).
"s Unless the carrier obtains approval of the NMB, it risks the possibility that the union for the
old craft will see representation for employees who have been effectively merged with another craft.
7The alternative to this approach would be: (1) To refuse to bargain with the possibility of
criminal penalties if the carrier is wrong; (2) to file a declaratory judgment action in a United
States district court, requesting the Court to declare that it should not bargain until the incumbent union's status is tested by an NMB-conducted election; and (3) to.notify the NMB of the
changed circumstances with the hope that it will order the union to participate in an election or
lose its representative status. Both (2) and (3) are awkward and there is no guarantee that an
election will be held.
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C. Automatic Revocation of Certification
There are two instances when the Board (following a hearing) should
revoke the certification of the incumbent union without an election. The
first is when the union is unfairly representing the employees in the craft.
The NLRB has held that disestablishment is a proper remedy for unlawful
discrimination." Accordingly, the RLA should be amended to achieve this
result. The amendment would cover not only racial discrimination but
all forms of hostile discrimination. For example, following a strike where
the strikers have been lawfully discharged or replaced, the union should
lose its representative status if it seeks to protect the strikers at the expense
of the newly hired employees. The second instance appropriate for automatic revocation occurs when the union is aiding a competing carrier at
the expense of the carrier whose employees it represents. This is merely
an indirect form of unfair representation, for if the carrier is hurt economically, its employees will suffer. The Act should eliminate all forms of
actual and potential conflict, including loans to competing carriers by the
local, its International or a trust fund in which the union selects half the
trustees.7 8 In these circumstances, the union should be given 30 days in
which to remedy the conflict. Failure to do so should result in disestablishment.
IV.

CONCLUSION

A substantial part of this examination has been devoted to a discussion
of the National Mediation Board's handling of representation problems.
No attempt has been made to review all representational issues, for example,
the status of professional and confidential employees and petitions to clarify
an NMB craft or class determination. The emphasis has been on areas
where the Board could, under the existing Act, rectify the situation, but
has failed to act because of its discrimination against carriers and employees who wish to remain unorganized. The proposed amendments, by
safeguarding the rights of all parties involved-carrier, union and employees-will achieve the balance which Congress thought it had enacted
into law with the 1934 amendments.
Obviously, some of the criticism directed at the Board is due to the very
nature of the Railway Labor Act which places certain areas outside the
NMB control. Thus, the Act does not grant the Board power to handle
unfair labor practices, nor does it prohibit certain conduct by unions,
such as secondary boycotts and the discipline of employees for exercising
" In Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962), the National Labor Relations Board, basing its
decision on the Fifth Amendment, held that where a union executes a racially discriminatory contract revocation of the contract is warranted. Under NLRB rules, certification blocks the holding
of another election for a year. This allows the union a sufficient period in which to obtain a contract
and administer it. By this action, the Board assists the union, but if the union refuses to represent
all employees in the bargaining unit, no reason exists for the Board's continued assistance. The
Board, an agency of the United States, cannot allow this benefit to exist without becoming a
participant
in the discrimination and thus violating the Constitution.
78
This would reserve the decision in NLRB v. David Buttrick Co., 399 F.2d 505, 4 N.B.P.C.
198 (1968).
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their rights under the Act. Even subjects covered by the Act-mediation
and emergency disputes-need to be revised to make the Board's functions
more meaningful. Nevertheless, the Board's failure in the representation
area is relevant to all other areas, for if the Board has favored unions in
subjects where the law is unclear (at least to the NMB), it can be expected
that revisions of other areas will meet with the same fate unless the amendments explicitly accomplish the objectives Congress wishes to achieve.

